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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
»
%

Plaintiff-Respondent,

C-.ase
-

v

s

-

.

• • ' . ' • •

:

RICHARD CAUBLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
.

•

•

•

•

•

•

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1975),
a felony of the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried to a jury in the Fourth Judicial
District Court.

The

jury returned a verdict of guilty

to the charge of theft of property of a value exceeding
$1,000, and the Honorable George E. Ballif entered a
judgment and sentence on that verdict.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

I

Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment
and sentence entered by the court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In November, 1974, defendant was employed by
Western Leisure Industries, Inc., a corporation that
manufactures

and sells house trailers.

13, 1974, defendant

On November

sold three of the company's trailers to

Boyd Wheelwright,,: He paid for the trailerls with a check
in the amount of $9,262 drawn on an office of Zions
First National Bank located in Utah County (T. 47,
Plaintiff's Exhibit no. 6). At the time Mr. Wheelwright
delivered the check to the defendant, the defendant
stated that he was going to use some of the money to
"reimburse himself."

(T. 49,112).

On November 14, 1974, the defendant took the
check to an office of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust located
in Salt Lake County, opened an account in the name of
the Mansford Corporation (a pseudonym for the defendant)
and deposited the check.

The defendant then withdrew from

the account $262.00 cash and approximately $4,917 in the
form of a cashier's check made out to the Blazor Corporation, the sole stockholder of Western Leisure.

The

defendant delivered the check to Mr. Giles, the
company's comptroller, in exchange for a promissory
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note in the amount of the check.

The defendant told Mr/

Giles that the money had come from a lawsuit he had won
back East (T.29).

About one week later, Norma Peterson,

Office Manager for Western Leisure, asked the defendant
about the Wheelwright transaction at her office in Payson
(T. 51,58).

The defendant told Mrs. Peterson that the

deal had fallen through and promised to return the
Statements of Origin covering the trailers to her (T. 58).
Mr. Giles testified that the normal procedure following
the sale of a trailer was to deliver the check to Mrs.
Peterson in Payson, who would receipt the check before it
was deposited into a company account by either Mr. Giles
or Mrs. Peterson (T. 15,21).

Mr. Giles also testified

that if a check was received in Salt Lake City, the check
could be directly delivered to Mr. Giles1 Salt Lake City
office, and that this was the only circumstance where
Mrs. Peterson's office would be bypassed (T.21).

Mr.

Giles testified that the defendant had•no authority to
endorse or sign checks (T. 22). The defendant testified
that on occasions he would not take the checks to Mrs.
Peterson's Office if he were in another area (T. 132).
The defendant did not deny depositing the check
in question into his account, but claimed that he was
entitled to the money because Western Leisure had failed
to reimburse him for certain expenses and back pay.
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On .November 13, 1976, the defendant claimed that the
amount owed him was between $9,500 and $10,000 (T. 130).
The defendant at first claimed that he had deposited
no other checks belonging to his employer into his own
account, but later admitted that he had offset checks
of about $3,327 and $1,215 prior to the incident in
November, 1974 (T. 148, 161-163, 168).
Boyd Saderup, President of the Blazor Corporation
testified that his accounting records showed that the
defendant was owed between $300 and $600.

David Giles

testified that the only unpaid claims due to the defendant
amounted to between $200 and $300, and that the defendant
had received some $2,017 in advance for expenses which the
defendant had not accounted for by the return of vouchers,
receipts or cancelled checks, despite requests to do so
(T. 189-191).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty and judgment
was entered on that verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT!S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE GROUND OF IMPROPER
VENUE.
A.

Defendant waived his objection to improper

venue.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2) (Supp. 1975),
provides that:
"All objections of improper place
of trial are waived by a defendant
unless made before trial."
In the recent case of State v. Christean, 533 P.2d 872
(Utah 1975) this Court held that a defendant in a criminal
case can waive his constitutional right to have an action
against him tried in the county where the cause of
action arose, that the waiver need not be express, and
that an objection made for the first time on appeal will
not be considered.
In this case, defendant made no objection to the
place of his trial until after the State had rested its
case (T. 8 6).

Counsel for the State indicated that a timely

request for a transfer would have been honored (T.87).
Defendant has not alleged any reasons that excuse or
explain the delay, nor has any prejudice to the defendant
been shown.
As the Court stated in State v. Biggs, 198 Ore.
413, 255 P.2d 1055, the gist of the constitutional guarantee
of a fair and impartial trial in the county where the
crime was committed is a fair and impartial trial, and
the guarantee of the place of trial is a mere incident
of the primary right to a fair trial.
Respondent submits that the defendant was given
a fair trial in all respects, and that defendant's belated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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attempt to invoke a technical error should be denied
as being contrary to the interest of justice.
B.

The crime of theft as defined in Utah Code

Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1975), was completed in Utah
County where the trial was held.
Respondent submits that the analysis of the
issue of where the crime occurred turns on the resolution
of an ambiguity in the statute that defines theft.

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1975) , states that "a person
commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.11

It is not clear whether the word

"obtains" in the statute refers to "unauthorized control"
or to "property".

In other words, the statute is sub-

ject to two constructions:
1.

A person commits theft if he obtains the

property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof
or if he exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
2.

A person commits theft if he obtains un-

authorized control or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
Respondent submits that the first interpretation
is more in keeping with the legislative intent.
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The

phrases "obtains control" and "exercises control" are
interchangeable and the use of both

terms would be

mere surplusage under the second interpretation of the
statute.

However, a person may exercise unauthorized

control over property without obtaining it, as when a
thief directs an innocent agent to deliver property
belonging to another to a creditor of the thief,
or when a thief deprives an owner of his property by
destroying or misusing it.
be logical

The use of both terms would

and necessary under the first interpretation.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(2) (Supp. 1975) defines
"obtain" as meaning "to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some.other legally recognized interest
in property. . . . "
control.

without reference to unauthorized

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407 (Supp. 1975) defines

the crime of theft of lost property solely in terms of
obtaining property without mention of unauthorized
control.

Respondent submits that the first interpretation

of.the statute defining theft is the proper construction,
and that unauthorized control is not always an element
of the crime of theft.
Under this interpretation of the statute, it
is clear that the crime of theft was completed in Utah
county, because the defendant admitted obtaining the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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check from Mr. Wheelwright in Utah County with an intent
to convert it to his own use (T. 1.12).
Assuming that this Court were to adopt the second
interpretation of the statute defining theft, respondent
still submits that the crime of theft was completed in
Utah County.

Defendant's contention that the evidence

clearly establishes his authority to receive checks in
Utah County and to deliver them to an office in Salt
Lake City is not supported by the record (T. 15,21,132).
Assuming defendant did have that authority, he would
still be without authority to turn the checks over to
a creditor of his employer.

Such a delivery would be

an unauthorized control in the county where it occurred,
even if the creditor deposited the checks in another
county.

In this case, defendant claimed to be a creditor

of his employer, and when he took the checks into his
personal possession intending to retain them in satisfaction
of a supposed debt, he in effect delivered the checks
to a creditor in excess of his authority.
Assuming that all of defendant's behavior in
Utah County were within the scope of his authority as
an agent of the corporation, defendant would still have
exercised "unauthorized control" over the property as
that phrase is used in the statute.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-6-404(4) (Supp. 1975) defines the phrase "obtain
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or exercise unauthorized control" to include, inter
alia, conduct heretofore known or defined as common
law embezzlement.

In other words, if the defendant's

acts in Utah County constituted the common law crime
of embezzlement, the venue of the action would properly
be in Utah County.
In the case of State v. Dykes, 261 Iowa, 1363
158 N.W. 2d 154 (1968) the defendant was charged with
embezzlement of a load of grain.

The grain was entrusted

to the defendant in Story County for delivery in Scott
County, but the defendant sold the grain in Appanoose
County.

The Supreme Court of Iowa held that venue was

properly laid in Story County, reasoning that:
"Where the defendant received
property in a county of this State
and thereafter fraudulently converts
the same to his own use, the jury
may be authorized by the evidence to
conclude that the intent to convert
the same was formed in the county
where the property was entrusted to
him, and venue under such evidence may
properly be laid in that county.ff
158 N.W.2d at 157.
Again, the defendant by his own admission expressed
intent to convert the check to his ovm use when he received
it in Utah County (T. 112).
In the case of People v. Brock, 21 Cal. App.
2d 601, 70 P.2d 210 (1937), the defendant was charged
with grand theft of machinery belonging to a mining
company of which he was a director.

The equipment was
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removed from a mine and taken to a location in San
Bernadino County, and later sold in Los Angeles County.
The court held that, although the actual misappropriation
took place in Los Angeles, the evidence justified an
inference that the intent to embezzle was formed in
San Bernadino, and that the defendant could properly
be tried there.

It is interesting to note that in Iowa

and California, unlike Utah, the prosecution must prove
venue beyond a reasonable doubt.

Respondent submits

that the evidence unequivocally demonstrates the formation of a criminal intent in Utah County, and under the
terms of Utah Code Ann. 76-6-401(4) (Supp. 1975),
venue was properly laid there.
Alternatively, venue could be laid in Utah County
on the theory that defendant failed to account there.
In Williams v. State, 365 P.2d 569 (Okla. Crim. 1961),
defendant was charged with embezzlement of funds he had
received as a salesman for an insurance company.

The

defendant claimed that he could only be tried where the .
checks had been cashed, but the court held that the prosecution could be brought where the defendant had an obligation
to account for the funds.

In this case, a demand for

the money was made in Utah County (T. 51,58).

See also

State v. Boulet, 5 Wash. 2d 654, 106 P.2d 311 (1940).
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Finally, venue could be properly laid in Utah
County because the check the defendant embezzled was
drawn on a bank located there, and consequently the
check was paid

there.

In People v. Keller, 79 Cal.

App. 612, 250 P.585 (1926), a corporate vice-president
deposited a company check in a bank located in Orange
County, and wrote an unauthorized check against the
account in Los Angeles County.

The court held that the

offense of embezzlement was completed in Orange County
where the bank honored the check.. See also State v.
Johnson, 109 Kan. 239, 199 P. 104 (1921).
In sum, respondent submits that the crime of
theft was completed in the county where defendant was
tried because defendant obtained the property with
intent to deprive there, failed to account there, and
the check stolen was paid there.
C.

Venue was properly laid pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (1) (g) (iii) (Supp. 1975), a c o n stitutional statute.
Defendant has challenged Utah Code Ann. 76-1-202
(1) (g) (iii) (Supp. 1975) as denying his constitutional
right to trial where the crime occurred.

As this court

stated in White v. Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.,
25 U. 346, 71 P. 593 (1903), the constitutional right to
a particular place of trial must be interpretated in light

-11-
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of the common law existing at the time the constitution
was adopted.

Although there is a general rule prohibiting

the prosecution of a criminal defendant in a county other
than that where the crime occurred, there is a widely
recognized exception for larceny*

22 C.J.S. Criminal

Law § 185(8} states:
"Both at common law and under
statutory provisions in most states
one who steals property in one
county and brings it into another
may be indicted and tried for simple
larceny either in the county where
the theft was committed, or in any
county into or through which the
stolen property was brought; the
theory being that the possession of
the stolen goods by the thief is a
larceny in every county through or
into which he carries them, because
as the legal possession still remains
in the owner, every moment's continuance
of the trespass and felony amounts to
a new taking and asportation. . . ." *
Statutes declarative of this common law rule
have been upheld against constitutional attacks.

156

ALR 882, 886, states:
"The conflict of authority on the
subject has been alleviated in many
jurisdictions by enactment of statutes
in effect recognizing the majority view
by providing in substance that any
person who shall steal in another state
or country any goods and shall thereafter
bring the same into the state may be
prosecuted and convicted of larceny in
the county to which such goods are
brought or in which he is found, in
the same manner as if such larceny had
been committed in this state, and that
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in every such case the larceny
may be charged to have been
committed in any county into or
through which such stolen property
may have been brought.
*

*

*

The constitutionality of such
statutes and the power of the
legislature to enact them have
been for the most part sustained as
against various objections, such as
. . . that it is violative of the
constitutional provision securing
in all criminal prosecutions the
right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury of the county
in which the crime shall have been
committed. . . . "
In addition to the authorities collected in the above
annotations, respondent respectfully refers this Court
to People v. Brickey, 346 111. 273, 178 N.E. 483 (1931),
State v. Bretz, 534 P.2d 496 (Mont. 1975), and Schultz
v. Lainson, 234 Iowa 606, 13 N.W. 2d 326 (1944) upholding
state statutes allowing prosecution for theft in any
county into which stolen property is brought against constitutional attacks.
Appellant has cited State v. Caroll, 55 Wash.
588, 104 Pac. 814 (1909), as authority that such a
statute is unconstitutional.

Actually the Washington

Court refused to apply such a statute to a burglary
prosecution, where the theory of a continuing trespass
clearly does not apply.

The court did recognize that:
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"It is generally true that in
cases of larceny courts have
generally held that the defendant
could be tried either in the county
where the offense was committed,
or in the county to which the goods
have been removed." 104 at P. 814.
The Washington Supreme Court has upheld a statute
allowing a defendant to be prosecuted for larceny in any
county into which stolen property is brought.

State

v. Moore, 189 Wash. 680, 66 P.2d 836 (1937).
It is important to remember the narrow application
and remedial purpose of the Utah statute.

Under Utah

Code Ann. § 76-1-202 (1) (g) (iii) (Supp. 1975), a
prosecution can only be brought in the county where only
control of the property is shown when "it cannot be
readily determined in which county or district the offense
occurred."

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-202(1) (g) (Supp. 1975).

Such a common sense attempt to deal with the technical
problem of venue in a criminal prosecution is clearly
remedial and subject to liberal construction within
constitutional limits. Addington v. State, 199 Kan.
554, 431 P.2d 532 (167).
It is clear that defendant had control of the
property in Utah County, and under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202
(1) (g) (iii) (Supp. 1975) venue was properly laid in Utah
County.
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Respondent submits that it was not error to deny
defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the grounds
of improper venue.
POINT II
THE STATE PROVED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (3) (Supp. 1975) states
that:
"The existence of jurisdiction
and venue are not elements of the
offense but shall be established by
a preponderance of the evidence."
In the case of State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d
618 (1955), this court held that venue need only be
established by a preponderance of the evidence, that
venue was not an element of an offense and that venue
could be established

inferentially from circumstantial

evidence.
As argued more extensively in Point I above,
defendant has waived any objection he may have had to
the place of trial and the evidence supports the finding
that venue was in Utah County.

Respondent submits that

the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion
for a directed verdict.
POINT III
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S TAKING OF OTHER CHECKS
BELONGING TO HIS EMPLOYER WAS RELEVANT AND PROPERLY
ADMITTED.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55 provides that
evidence of other crimes is admissible to establish
absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity.
In this case, the major issue at trial was
the defendant's motive and intent in appropriating
his employer's check*

Identity was not at issue because

defendant admitted cashing the check (T. 112-113).
Although the evidence of defendant's taking of other checks
revealed an inconsistency in the defendant's testimony,
it was not admitted for the purpose of attacking his
credibility as evidence of prior felony convictions
would be.

The evidence was admitted to shed light

on defendant's claim that the check was taken pursuant
to a bona fide claim of right, and demonstrated that the
taking was pursuant to a common plan or scheme.
When this purpose for the admission of the
evidence is kept in mind, the authority cited by the
defendant is clearly distinguishable.

In the case of

State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), this
Court held that evidence of prior dissimiliar robberies
was inadmissible to establish a defendant's identity as
a robber.

In State v. Kazda, 14 U. 2d 266, 382 P.2d

407 (1963), a defendant's prior criminal record was
brought out for the purpose

of impeaching his testimony.
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The admission of details about the prior crimes was
held prejudicial error because:
" . . . the details or circumstances
surrounding the felony or felonies for
which the accused was convicted may not
be inquired into except under unusual
circumstances where the inquiry would
tend to show a scheme, plan, modus
operandi or the like." 14 U.2d at 269.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Peterson, 23 U.2d 58, 457 P.2d 532
(1969), a defendant charged v/ith selling LSD entered into
evidence a theme he had written showing his opposition
to drugs.

The prosecutor's attempt to smear the defendantfs

character by inquiring into incidences of drug use was
held prejudical.

None of these authorities stand for the

proposition that when a defendant embezzles a check with
criminal intent, pursuant to a scheme or plan, that
evidence of other thefts showing this intent and part
of the same plan cannot be admitted.
In State v. Lack, 118 U.128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950),
a defendant was charged with embezzlement of whiskey, and
evidence that the defendant had

sold this whiskey to

clubs and split payments was held to be admissible even
though it showed commission of other crimes not charged.
The evidence was found to be relevant to a scheme or
plan.

In State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1975),

a defendant was charged with mishandling public money,
and evidence of other shortages in the defendant's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

department was held admissible as tending to show motive,
intent, and absence of mistake or accident.
In State v. Georgopoulos, 27 U.2d 53, 492 P2d
1353 (1972) a defendant was charged with receiving
stolen goods, and evidence of the possession of other
stolen items was held admissible as bearing on the
guilty knowledge of the defendant.
In this case, defendant claimed an innocent
intent in taking $9,262 belonging to his employer because
he believed he was entitled to between $9,500 and
$10,000.

Evidence that the defendant had already stolen

some $4,500 was clearly relevant in assessing the honesty
of that claim, and evidence that the prior takings had
occurred in precisely the same manner showed that the
taking was according to a common scheme.

In factual

settings indistinguishable from the present case, evidence
of this type was held properly admitted.

State v. Hess,

86 Wash. 2d 51, 541 P.2d 1222 (1975), People v. Kendall,
•151 P.2d 39, 65 Cal.App.2d 569 (1944) and Thorp v. People,
110 Colo. 7, 129 P.2d 296 (1942).

Respondent submits that

evidence of other checks taken by the defendant was
properly admitted as relevent to the issues of motive,
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intent, absence of mistake or accident, and the presence
of a common scheme*
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the defendant was tried
in the proper county, that the State provided all
elements of the offense and that the evidence admitted
at trial was relevant and not unduly prejudicial.

The

judgment and sentence of the lower court should be,
therefore, affirmed„
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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